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Articles
Hermann Mosler* The International Court of
Justice at its Present Stage of
Development
1.
The object of this study is not to give an outline on the role and
function of the International Court of Justice in general but to
evaluate its present situation. This is quite a different subject
although for this purpose it will be indispensable to compare
achievement reached by the Court with the role assigned to it at the
time of its foundation as part of the basic structure of the United
Nations, the legal organization of the international community.
Reminding at the very beginning, of deficiencies actually existing, I
do not want to intimate that the problems with which judicial
settlement of international disputes is confronted are due to the
Court, either entirely or in its major part. The principal difficulty
stems from the fact that adjudication of disputes by courts is today,
for various reasons, less popular in the international society than
other means of settling conflicting interests.
"The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations." This is the wording of Article 92 of
the Charter. The Court is the only judicial institution to which all the
States in the world have access. Its function is not restricted to the
members of the United Nations. The Charter constitutes it as the
general Court of the international community as a whole,
non-member States being admitted to submit their disputes to the
Court either through becoming a party to its Statute (which forms an
integral part of the Charter) on conditions determined by the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council, 1 or by making particular or general declarations of
*LL. D. (Univ. of Bonn); former Professor at Universities of Bonn, Frankfurt &
Heidelberg; former Director of Max Planck Inst. for Foreign Public Law & Public
Int'l Law; former Judge of European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg; former
ad hoc Judge of International Court of Justice, The Hague.
1. General Assembly resolutions concerning Switzerland (December 11, 1946);
Lichtenstein (December 1, 1949); San Marino (December 9, 1953); and Japan until
her admission to the U.N. (December 9, 1953). See (1947-48), I.C.J. Yearbook at
30; (1949-50), I.C.J. Yearbook at 161; (1953-54), I.C.J. Yearbook at 204
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accepting the jurisdiction of the Court under a resolution of the
Security Council as early as 1946.2
On the other hand, the Statute of the Court hardly reflects the
organizational element which has become a significant feature of
modern international society. The Court's contentious jurisdiction is
limited to legal disputes between States. Its power to give advisory
opinions on legal questions is subject to a request made in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations
Charter. 3 The individual person whose fundamental rights are now
guaranteed by many international conventions, 4 is totally ignored
by the Statute.
The provisions of the Charter and the Statute conferring
jurisdiction on the Court, thus, did not follow the development and
trends of modern international life and international law, the Court's
basic structure being framed in the initial period of the League of
Nations. 5
As the general court of the community of nations the Court
applies universally binding international law. The sources of that
law are mentioned in the well-known Article 38 of its Statute. The
Court is obliged to apply international conventions, international
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and the
general principles of law.
Furthermore, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations
the Court applies, should the occasion arise, the Charter and the
special law given by the organs of the United Nations in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter. The Court is thus pushed on the
way to develop the relationships between general international law
and the principles and rules of the Charter. The evolution of the
latter proceeds faster than the law-making process of general
international law, the criteria of which are much stricter. The Court
is therefore in a better position to contribute to developing
international law than any other court or arbitrator in the world.
States are of course free to take advantage of the Court's services
2. Res. 9 (1946) of The Security Council Concerning Admission of States not
Parties to the Statute of the Court, Oct. 15, 1946 in I.C.J. Acts & Documents
Concerning the Organization of the Court, No. 4: Charter of the United Nations,
Statute and Rules of Court and other Documents, 1978, at 174-185
3. Art. 65; cf. (1977-78), I.C.J. Yearbook at 38-40
4. U.N. Doc. St/HR/I/Rev. 1
5. For a recent discussion on access to the Court for legal entities other than States
and for individual persons see D. A. Ijalaye, The Extension of Corporate
Personality in International Law (1978), at 256-268
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or to opt for other possibilities to settle their disputes peaceably. The
actual importance which the Court can possibly have in
international life therefore depends upon the extent to which States
can be convinced that recourse to this institution best serves their
interests.
In recent years it became usual to speak of the Court as a sick
institution, of a patient who needed some help to recover. The
medicaments prescribed have been multiple, relating both to efforts
made from inside of the Court and from outside. A recent book on
the Court, written by authors teaching at universities in the United
States, has the subtitle "An Analysis of a Failure". 6 A contribution
to the Polish Yearbook of International Law7 doubts that the d6tente
in international relations will increase very much the role of
international courts. The writer identifies the Hague Court with the
western concept of international courts modelled on international
adjudication which has, according to him, completely failed during
both world wars. Effectiveness of judicial settlement seems to him
as having a chance only if disputes have no great political
significance and if the legal elements are preponderant. The most
striking and most serious warning comes from a member of the
Court itself, my friend and predecessor in office, the late Swedish
judge, Sture Petr~n. In a contribution called "Some Thoughts on
the Future of the International Court of Justice," 8 he wrote: "The
Court's time as a judicial organ thus seems to berunning out, unless
the recent remodelling of its Chambers ad hoc proves to have
opened a road back to the Court's former position in the life of the
international community.' -9
Although opinion of this kind, ranging from personal disap-
pointment to complete rejection of judicial settlement on the basis of
general international law, dominates the public scene, it should not
be forgotten that such views are, to a certain extent, balanced by
others. Thus, for example, Professor Jennings of Cambridge started
a report on the Court by insisting that he did not consider his task as
devising some rescue operation for an institution that had failed.
Far from being a failure the Court has in a very difficult period
exercised a profound influence upon the development of
6. J. K. Gamble and D. A. Fisher, The International Court of Justice, 1976
7. R. Bierzanek, Some Remarks on the Function of International Courts in the
Contemporary World (1975), 7 Polish Yearbook of Intl. L. 121 at 148-149
8. (1975), 6 Netherlands Yearbook of Intl. L. 59 at 75
9. Art. 7, para. 3 of the 1972 Rules; Art. 17 of the 1978 Rules (See infra note 35)
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international law and it has disposed of some important disputes.
It is right to be concerned at the relative lack of business for the
Court but it is also easy to exaggerate its importance. '0
On the occasion of the fifty-year existence of the Court, including
its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
American Society of International Law set up a panel consisting of
internationally respected and very experienced personalities to
analyze the present sitwotion and the possible development of the
Court. A publication of two volumes called The Future of the
International Court of Justice was the result of this effort. The work
strongly advocates enhancing the role of the Court. "'
A Court which is to such an extent the target of world-wide
discussion is evidently an institution to which a task of primary
importance for the international community has been entrusted. Let
us therefore look at the expectations of the founders of the United
Nations who revived in San Francisco, 34 years ago, the Permanent
Court of International Justice of the League of Nations in a slightly
different form, but without changing its idea in principle. The
Committee charged with that question formulated its proposals and
intentions in the following terms:
[The First Committee] ventures to foresee a significant role for
the new Court in the international relations of the future. The
judicial process will have a central place in the plans of the
United Nations for the settlement of international disputes by
peaceful means. . . . It is confidently anticipated that the
jurisdiction of this tribunal will be extended as time goes on, and
past experience warrants the expectation that its exercise of this
jurisdiction will commend a general support.
And then it went on with these pathetic words:
In establishing the International Court of Justice, the United
Nations hold before a war-stricken world the beacons of Justice
and Law and offer the possibility of substituting orderly judicial
processes for the viscissitudes of war and the reign of brutal
force. 12
10. R. Y. Jennings, "Report: Does the International Court of Justice, as it is
Presently Shaped, Correspond to the Requirements which Flow from its Functions
as the Central Judicial Body of the International Community?" in Judicial
Settlement of International Disputes, an International Symposium held at the Max
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Berlin, 1974
11. Leo Gross, ed., The Future of the International Court of Justice (Vols. I & II,
1976) at X and 862
12. (1945), UNCIO 393 (Doc. 913 IV/1/74 (1), June 12, 1945)
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The hopes here expressed were certainly those of the vast majority
of the 51 States constituting the original membership of the United
Nations. It is well known that there have been strong tendencies in
favour of making the jurisdiction of the Court compulsory for all
member States. The effect would have been that being a member of
the United Nations or becoming admitted to it later would have
automatically included the general submission under the Court's
jurisdiction as well as the obligation to appear as defendant before
the Court if any other member should lodge unilaterally a complaint
concerning a legal dispute. But other countries, especially the great
powers, were reluctant to go so far. The result was the same as the
compromise made after the First World War, when the Statute of
the Permanent Court was made in the League of Nations. The
so-called optional or facultative clause was again embodied in the
new Statute. 13 While all members of the United Nations are entitled
to make use of the Court as one of the principal organs of the
organization, the faculty to do so or to bypass the Court depends on
the sovereign decision of each State. The optional clause is only a
technical device to facilitate the submission under the Court's
jurisdiction. It can substitute arbitration treaties, special com-
promissory clauses in other treaties, on condition that a State is
prepared to submit, on the basis of reciprocity, all legal disputes
with any other State which acts likewise. 14
Does the emphatic statement of the Committee Report in San
Francisco correspond to the legal position actually attributed to the
Court in the framework of the organization of the international
society? I think that the analysis of the role shows that the
expectation was exaggerated. It is true that the 2nd General
Assembly passed a resolution on the "Need for greater use by the
United Nations and its organs of the International Court of Justice"
in which it was underlined
. . . that it is also of paramount importance that the Court should
be utilised to the greatest practicable extent in the progressive
development of international law, both in regard to legal issues
between States and in regard to constitutional interpretation.
It concluded by recommending that the States should submit, "as a
general rule", their legal disputes to the International Court of
13. Art. 36, para. 2
14. For the history of the optional clause see Max Huber, Denkwiirdigkeiten
(1974), at 170-172
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Justice. 1 5
This resolution taken in the early years of the United Nations
proves that from the very beginning the idea was that the Court
should, in deciding legal disputes between States and in giving
advisory opinions to the United Nations and other organizations
authorized by the General Assembly to request such opinions,
promote the progress of development of international law.
On the other hand, one could not realistically think of the Court
acting as a sort of legislator. Either party to a dispute is entitled to
obtain a judgement on the basis of existing law unless the Court has
been authorized by them to go beyond established law and may
break new ground (cf. Art. 38, para. 2, of the Statute). Certainly,
international law is changing, and many of the old norms which
emerged in the age of European domination of the world, are no
longer the same as they were in the 19th century. The most famous
example is the legal concept of property and the extent to which it is
protected by general international law. Insofar as the Court is able to
state that a change in customary law or in the general principles of
law has taken place, or that a new rule has arisen or an old one
disappeared, it applies existing law. 16 The Court has to take account
of the evolution of the law, but it has always to apply the sources of
law as they are prescribed to him in Article 38 of its Statute.
Even when we take into account the restrictions of developing the
law inherent in the very concept of a court, the role of the Hague
institution in this respect is considerable.
The Court's outstanding task is the preservation of the unity of
international law. Since the Court is the only judicial institution of
general international law without any limitation with regard to
groups of States or to special treaty law, it has to apply international
law as a single coherent body of norms applicable to any legal
relations between the States constituting the international society.
No one could expect, not even in 1945 when the whole world was
decided against waging another war, that any court could preserve
world peace if vital conflicts of nations should arise again. But the
idea was to dissociate international disputes from their dangerous
political implications by settling them, on the basis of objective
legal norms, by independent and impartial judges.
15. For text and comment see H. Steinberger, "The International Court of
Justice," in Judicial Settlement, supra, note 10 at 201
16. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland), Merits, Judgments (1974), I.C.J.
Rep. at 23-24
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On the other hand, one cannot overlook that under the United
Nations Charter judicial settlement is only one of the long list of
means of settling disputes enumerated in Article 33 of the Charter.
That provision speaks of negotiation, inquiry, mediation and
conciliation before it comes to arbitration and judicial settlement. It
finishes by mentioning "other peaceful means of the parties' own
choice". Article 36 of the Charter puts a little stronger accent on the
International Court of Justice: the Security Council should take into
consideration that legal disputes should, "as a general rule" be
referred to the Court. One must conclude from these terms that
submission of disputes to the Court is considered to be the normal
way of solving legal questions. The practice of the Council did not
correspond, however, with this demand. Only once, in the Corfu
Channel case, in 1947, the Council made a recommendation in
accordance with Article 36, paragraph 3. Later proposals submitted
to it by different States on different occasions, in 1947, 1957 and
1960, were rejected. 17 When the General Assembly made probably
the most important declaration which it has ever proclaimed,
relating to principles of international law concerning friendly
relations and co-operation among States, it did not emphasize the
role of the Court but only repeated the wording of Article 33 of the
Charter. 18
The discussions in the United Nations which took place in the
first years of this decade on the occasion of the fiftieth birthday of
the institution revealed a lot of diverging views. While most of the
participating delegations, not only the so-called group of western
and other powers, made proposals to enhance the role of the Court,
there were also opinions expressed which were reluctant and in
some cases even unfriendly. 19
In any political system, national or international, courts can only
play an effective role if they have the opportunity to exercise their
jurisdiction in a considerable number of cases brought before them
during a certain period of time. Frequent use has never been made
of the Court, but it was used more often during the first two
decades. A comparison with the Permanent Court of International
Justice shows, however, that the balance is in favour of the latter.20
17. Supra, note 15 at 209
18. (1970), 9 Int'l Legal Materials 1295
19. Supra, note 15 at 231
20. See "Judgments of the International Court of Justice, Part XVI, in Kr.
Marek, ed., A Digest of the International Court 1959-1975, Vol. 11 (1978), at 674
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Furthermore, it must be observed that the political implications of
the cases in the League of Nations' period were of higher
importance than the average case after World War II.
The present Court has been active in 44 contentious cases and 15
requests for advisory opinions. It is an alarming fact that in recent
years three governments against which proceedings have been
instituted decided unilaterally that the Court lacked jurisdiction,
although Article 36, paragraph 6, confirms that the decision on the
jurisdictional question belongs to the Court itself.2 ' To be sure,
these judgments are not without importance; they were, it is true,
not able to solve the actual disputes but the reasons will be
considered as dicta on questions of international law; they may even
be contributions to its progressive development in the limits I have
already tried to draw. When we compare them with the great many
instruments which confer jurisdiction on the Court, the lack of
proportion strikes the eye.
A hundred and fifty one member States of the United Nations and
three non-members are parties to the Statute. The number of States
recognizing the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court according to the
optional clause runs actually up to forty five. 22 They consist of
States of all five continents, Western and African States prevailing.
One must, of course, take account of the many important
reservations restricting the scope of such declarations. One of the
most famous is that of Canada, of April 7, 1970, excluding from the
jurisdiction of the Court, besides the usual reservation regarding
questions of national jurisdiction, also disputes arising out of or
concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by Canada in
respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the
living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control
of pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine
areas adjacent to the coast of Canada.23 This reservation is not
quoted here in order to blame the Canadian Government but to show
that there exists, apart from well-known restrictions of the
declarations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, another
type of reservation relating to vital interests of the declaring State.
In the view of the Canadian Government, international law
regarding the matters excluded from the Court's jurisdiction was not
21. See D. G. Partan, Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of
Justice (1977), 18 Harvard Int'l. L.J. at 562-563
22. (1977-78), I.L.C. Yearbook at48
23. See text in (1975-76), I.L.C. Yearbook at 54
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sufficiently developed. As the Government pointed out in a note to
the United States Government of April 16, 1970, it was not
prepared to await the gradual development of international law,
neither by other States through their practice nor through the
possible development of rules of law through multilateral treaties.
2 4
This is an impressive example of the option left to the States by the
Statute to limit their recognition of the Court's jurisdiction. The
number of declarations does therefore not reflect their actual scope.
To get the whole picture, one must study them in detail.
A great many treaties, bilateral and multilateral, contain clauses
relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in contentious proceedings.
Such clauses generally provide that disputes concerning the
application or interpretation of the instrument may be referred to the
Court for decision. Surveys of treaties in force with clauses of this
kind are published in each edition of the Yearbook. In the last
twelve months, five multilateral treaties include such provisions.
2 5
Looking at these long lists one could think that the Court must be
overloaded with work. But it is an old experience in international
relations that the number of conciliation procedures, compromi-
ssory clauses and provisions made for binding interpretation of
international instruments by a pre-established authority, including a
court, gives no indication of the number of disputes actually
submitted to such institutions.2 6 There are specialized permanent
tribunals set up in international instruments which never came to
life. One does not, therefore, need to increase the number of
international instruments but to use the existing ones.
The obvious tendency of States to settle their differences by
non-judicial means is not an indication that their relations are bad. A
judicial decision which leaves one party the winner and the other the
loser may create a situation which does not correspond to the needs
of the litigant States for compromise and co-operation. The
effective role of the judiciary is a criterion of a society which has
reached a high degree of integration. The present situation of the
international community which is half way between the anarchy of
sovereign States and organized co-operation, prevents the effective-
24. (1970), Int'l. Legal Materials at 607 to 611
25. Report of International Court of Justice to U.N. General Assembly, Aug. 18,
1978
26. See the statistical information on treaties including compromissory clauses in L.
B. Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Interpretation and Application of
Treaties( 1976, II), 150 Recueil des. Cours 259
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ness of courts being compared with that of the national judiciary
applying an elaborate system of norms and acting on the authority of
a State to which the parties are subjected. As long as no such
hierarchy exists between the Court and the parties, international
judicial decisions shall derive their authority from the sovereign will
of both parties.
Judicial settlement should play an increasing role, corresponding
to the increasing integration of the international society. If
circumstances are favourable, courts may even stimulate the process
of integration. In the European Community the Court of Justice in
Luxembourg made, in recent years, effective contributions to
developing a closer union of the States concerned. This court
however, can act on the basis of treaties which leaves the door open
for a closer economic and political union. Thus far, the Court could
be sure that its jurisprudence met the approval of the majority of the
population of the nations; the governments did not, at least, oppose
it.
The International Court is to a lesser degree in a similar situation.
Since the consensus of the nations does not support it to the same
extent, and since many governments are not favourable to judicial
settlement either generally or, at least to judgments on major issues,
its methods to develop the law must be much more cautious. Its role
as an integrating factor cannot be the same.
The Court's success in the future depends on the increasing
efficacy of the purposes and principles of the United Nations; it
cannot be more efficient than the United Nations in each stage of
their development. It is therefore incorrect and misleading to stress
an alleged crisis of the Court without analyzing, at the same time,
the current views in the United Nations family with regard to the
settlement of disputes.
As long as diplomatic channels, negotiations, pressure exercised
in international organs by majority vote and other means of
defending States' interests are preferred to submission to courts, no
one can expect that recourse to the I.L.C. will be considered as the
natural way to settle disputed matters.
II.
To improve the situation many proposals have been made. They can
be summarized as follows:
a) The establishment of chambers for cases concerning States
belonging to the same region.
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The constitution of chambers for particular categories of
cases.
The constitution of a system of functional and a regional
hierarchy of cases.
Institution of appeal procedures against decisions of other
international bodies.
Forming of itinerant chambers of the Court.
b) The taking into consideration at the time of each election, of
whether candidates are nationals of States which have
recognized the compulsory jurisdiction according to the
Optional Clause.
Enlarging or modification of the composition of the Court so
that it would reflect the structure of the international
community.
Better preparation of the lists of candidates by the national
groups of the Court of Arbitration and extension this
procedure to the appointment of national judges ad hoc.
c) More frequent recourse of the Security Council to recom-
mendations to refer cases to the Court, according to Article
36, paragraph 3 of the Charter.
More frequent use of the right to request advisory opinion
and more appropriate procedures to prepare the questions to
be submitted.
2 7
The Statute being an integral part of the Charter, it can be
amended only by the same complicated procedure as the Charter
itself.2 8 Since it is unlikely that changes will be made in the
forseeable future, such proposals should be discussed in the first
place which can be realized without amending the constitutional
texts.
1. The Court disposes, within the limits of the Statute and the
Charter, of the power to enact and to amend its Rules of procedure.
Although procedural matters do not touch the core of the problems
with which the Court is confronted, the revision of the Rules may
nevertheless open doors which seem to be difficult to pass.
As early as 1967 the Court decided to undertake a comprehensive
revision of its Rules adopted in 1946. The work then started in a
committee set up for the purpose of elaborating proposals for
27. See H. Golsong, The Role & Functioning of the International Court of Justice:
Proposals Recently Made on the Subject (1971), 31 Zeitschrift fur Auslindisches
Offentliches Recht und Vi6kerrecht 673
28. Art 69 of the Statute; Art 108 of the Charter
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submission to the plenary court. After four years of preparation the
Court enacted a partial revision limited to certain articles of the
Rules. Their key points were the following:
a) express permission given to the parties to influence the
composition of ad hoc chambers;
b) elimination of the right to exchange a second round of written
pleadings;
c) acceleration of advisory proceedings, especially by providing
oral hearings only in urged requests; and the express
authorization for the joinder of preliminary objections to the
merits.29
Several cases and requests for advisory opinions interrupted the
continuation of the revision until 1976 when the Court charged the
Committee in a new composition to complete the rest of the total
revision of the Rules. The new text was adopted by the Court on
April 14, 1978; it was enacted on July 1, 1978.30 The changes of
1972 were incorporated almost unaltered. The modifications and
additions made with regard to that part of the Rules of 1946 which
had not been affected in 1972, endeavour to make the procedure as
flexible and expeditious as possible and to facilitate recourse to
Chambers and the use of advisory opinions. The new Rules follow a
somewhat different arrangement for the various sections of the
Rules. 31 Although the partial revision of 1972 may be considered to
be more important than most of the amendments made in 1978,
attention should be given to the new provisions on the joinder of
proceedings (Article 47), the indication not only of the number but
also of the names of the judges constituting the majority (Article
95), the possibility of sitting elsewhere than at The Hague for part of
the proceedings (Article 55), and the possibility of special reference
to the Court which replaces the old article on "appeals to the
Court" (Article 87).
2. The hopes were set highest upon the offer made to potential
parties to exercise influence on the formation and composition of a
29. E. Jimenez de Ar6chaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the
International Court of Justice (1973), 67 Am. J. of Int'l L I at 21
30. For text see I.C.J. Acts & Documents Concerning the Organization of the
Court, No. 4: Charter of the United Nations, Statute and Rules of Court and other
Documents (1978), at 92-161
31. See the explanation in (1977-78), I.C.J. Yearbook at III, and the Analytical
Table comparing the 1978 Rules with the text of the 1947 Rules as revised in 1972;
id. at 113-119
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chamber ad hoc. The idea was obviously to combine the advantages
of a permanent court with that of an arbitral Tribunal. Recourse to
this kind of chamber would prove more attractive to potential
litigants if the election of their members were to be based on a
consensus between the Court and the parties. 32 Judge Petr6n, in the
passage of his article quoted earlier, went so far as to think that the
use of this new possibility was the condition of a promising future of
the Court.
33
Up to this moment, these expectations have not yet been
answered by potential litigants. But the delay elapsed since 1972
may be too short to allow a definite judgement.
According to the Statute, the Court shall sit, as a rule, in its full
composition. It provides, however, for three kinds of chambers: the
chamber of summary procedure, chambers for dealing with
particular categories of cases, the examples of which are labour
cases and cases relating to transit and communications, and
chambers for dealing with a particular case. 34 The latter is the type
of chamber to which the partial revision of the Rules of 1972 intends
to facilitate access.
35
The present rule repeats that of 1972 in a somewhat different
arrangement of paragraphs and wording. It provides for a
consultation of the President with the parties which have agreed
upon asking for the formation of a chamber ad hoc, not only on the
number of judges but also on the composition of the chamber. The
parties can discuss with him the names of the judges they desire to
become members of the chamber. The result of this consultation
shall be reported by the President to the plenary Court. The Statute
subjects only the number of the judges to the approval of the parties.
On the other hand it does not limit the scope of the President's
consultation with the parties. This lacuna is completed by the new
Rule: the consultation may be extended to the names of the judges.
The Court cannot, however, be dispensed from the provision of
the Statute prescribing that it must proceed by secret ballot to
elections of the members of all chambers, including ad hoc
chambers. It has thus the ultimate control over the composition of
any chamber. The result of the secret voting may therefore differ
from the wishes submitted by the parties to the President and
32. Supra, note 29 at 2
33. Supra, note 8 at 75
34. Arts 25 to 29 of the Statute
35. Art. 26, para. 2 of the Statute; Art. 17 of the 1978 Rules
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communicated by him to the Plenary Court. I agree with Judge
Jim6nez de Ar6chaga when he wrote, in 1973, that it would be
difficult to conceive that in normal circumstances those members
who have been suggested by the parties would not be elected." 8
Judge Petr6n said the same in unequivocal terms:
It goes without saying, however, that should the Court elect other
judges than those suggested by the parties, the latter could be
expected to withdraw the dispute from the Court and set up an
arbitral tribunal of their own, as already happens in so many
cases.
The General Assembly of the United Nations expressly noted, in its
resolution of November 22, 1974 on the review of the role of the
Court, that the Rules had been amended with a view to facilitating
recourse to it for the judicial settlement of disputes, inter alia, by
allowing for greater influence by the parties on the composition of
chambers ad hoc. 
37
3. What would be the advantages for the parties to resort to an ad
hoc chamber instead of bringing the case either before the whole
Court or before an arbitral tribunal set up by the potential litigants
themselves? As distinct from an arbitral tribunal, the chamber
would be part of the International Court of Justice. The International
Court of Justice would be constituted as a chamber exercising, in
regard to the concrete case submitted to it, the jurisdiction of the
Court itself.
The judgment is a judgment of the Court, having the same
effect as another decision of the Court. It has to be reported to the
Security Council in order to enable the Council to exercise its
function under Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which reads
as follows:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other Party
may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
Futhermore, the procedural rules to be applied are the Rules of
Court. The expenses of the proceedings are borne by the budget of
the International Court of Justice fixed by the United Nations; the
litigants contribute to it in their capacity as members of the Statute.
36. Supra, note 29 at 3
37. Supra, note 6 at 64
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The services of the Court's Registry are at the disposal of the
Chamber.
The differences from the normal recourse to the Plenary Court are
obvious; the bench does not consist of 15 judges plus, as the case
may be, one or two judges ad hoc appointed by the parties, but of a
group of judges selected from the whole Court.
Potential parties may feel that their interests are in good hands if
they are entrusted to some of the judges. From an idealistic point of
view it is certainly desirable that the whole Court, whoever may be
elected to it, enjoys the entire confidence of all member States of the
Statute. Recourse to a chamber of this kind may therefore be
considered as a necessary evil; if opposing parties are convinced
that a satisfying judicial settlement could be better reached by a
certain group of judges it seems to me preferable to form a chamber
ad hoc composed practically with the approval of the parties than to
leave it to the litigants to look for another way of settlement outside
the Court. On the whole the Court's function as the principal
judicial institution of the world community will be strengthened.
In the discussions on the role of the Court which took place in the
early 70s, the fact that the composition of the Court changes every
three years was criticized, to the effect that often a judge who
participated in the first phase of a case, for instance the dispute on
jurisdiction or on provisional measures of protection, was no longer
a member of the Court in further phases of the same case and did not
decide on the merits. It is true that certain inconsistencies in the
jurisprudence of the Court relating to consecutive phases of the
same case have not been avoided in the past. 38 The obligation and
the right of the judges to finish a case does not go beyond the end of
the phase in which he took part in the oral hearings. Although this
principle has been maintained in the revised Rules of 1978, 39 it does
not apply to chambers ad hoc. Members of such a chamber shall
continue to sit in all phases of the case, whatever the stage it has
reached when their term of election ends. 4 The parties can therefore
be sure that the same judges who have been appointed as members
of the chamber, continue to act in all phases of the case, whatever
stage it has reached at the end of their time in office. This seems to
38. See R. Bernhardt, Homogeneity, Continuity and Dissonances in the Case Law
of the International Court of Justice (1973), 33 Zeitschrift FUr AuslAndisches
Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 1
39. Rules of Court, Art. 33
40. Id., Art. 17, para. 4
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me an important difference.
Another provision of the new Rules applies equally to the Plenary
Court as to chambers, but will probably be more relevant to the
latter. The Court may, if it considers it desirable, decide, pursuant
to Article 22, paragraph 1, of the Statute, that all or part of the
further proceedings in a case shall be held at a place other than the
seat of the Court. Before so deciding, it shall ascertain the views of
the parties. 4
1
As mentioned before, proposals have been made to create
itinerant chambers which could go to the regions to which the
parties belong. The desire has been expressed that the Court should
come nearer to the parties. A chamber ad hoc which is more flexible
than the whole Court and the transfer of which in other parts of the
world is less expensive, could sit, if it is feasible, elsewhere than in
The Hague.
In this connection, it should not be forgotten that the summary
chambers for urgent cases can also exercise their functions,
according to the same provision, elsewhere than at The Hague.
Since this chamber is elected annually by the Court, its composition
cannot be influenced by the parties.
There seems to be no obstacle in the Statute to the Court forming
chambers for certain regions of the world. The present Rules do not
provide for that. Although it is, in my opinion, legally possible to
amend the Rules to this effect, objections could on the other hand,
be raised against this innovation. The main doubt expressed is that
regional chambers could endanger, as could equally regional courts,
the unity of general international law, particularly in a period of its
speedy development. 42
4. In my view, the attempt should be made to test how the revised
provisions on chambers work. The risk run by potential parties
asking for a chamber ad hoc is not great because the case remains in
their hands until the chamber is constituted by joint action of both
parties and the Court. If, however, this attitude of States should
become a custom it might change the character of the Court. At the
present stage, this foresight is certainly theoretical, but one should
already reflect at the beginning on consequences which may later
arise. It may occur that the same legal question is interpreted in a
41. Id., Art. 55
42. H. Mosler & R. Bemhardt, Report on International Symposium on Judicial
Settlement of International Disputes, Heidelberg, 1972 (1972), 32 Zeitschrift fir
AuslAndisches Offentliches Recht und V6lkerrecht 543 at 552
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different manner by the Plenary Court and a chamber. The same
may happen between two or more chambers. In national courts
subdivided into several chambers or senates the unity of the
jurisprudence is usually preserved by a decision of the plenary court
or a so-called great chamber or great senate to which the chamber or
senate which intends to differ from a previous judgment of another
chamber or senate or from the plenary court, must refer either the
whole case or at least the dispute or legal question. Such a solution
would be even more desirable for an international court. Provision
is made for recourse of the chamber to the Plenary Court in the
Rules of the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg. Where
a case pending before a chamber raises a serious question affecting
the interpretation of the Convention, the chamber must relinquish
jurisdiction in favour of the Plenary Court if the resolution of such
question might have a result inconsistent with a judgment
previously delivered by another chamber or by the Plenary Court.
The Plenary Court may either retain jurisdiction over the whole case
or may, after deciding on the question of interpretation, order that
the case be referred back to the chamber.
43
Transferring this idea to the International Court of Justice can be
left to the time when the problem arises in practice. I do not see any
obstacle in the Statute of the Court that could prevent the Court
itself providing for remedies by amending its Rules.
44
To conclude the discussion on chambers ad hoc I should like to
mention that it was also suggested that each of the parties could
agree on appointing a judge ad hoc and ask the Court to appoint a
third one. This procedure would bring the chamber ad hoc very near
to arbitration, enjoying the advantages of having the authority of the
Court and the gratuitous services of the Registry. But this would be
rather far away from the original idea of having a world court.
4 5
5. The efforts made in the revised rule, to speed up the
proceedings are useful and shall evidently be an answer to the
criticism made of their length. The Court now offers all that which
is within its power to accelerate the written as well as the oral
43. Rule 48 of the Rules of Court in European Convention on Human Rights,
Collected Texts (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1977) at 415
44. For a discussion of the question see T. 0. Elias, "Report to International
Colloquay at Heidelberg," in Judicial Settlement, supra, note 10 at 29 and
Hermann Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community (974 IV), 140
Recueil des Cours 303
45. See, supra, note 42 at 552
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proceedings. In fact, however, the Court is to a large extent in the
hands of the parties. If the parties do not want to obtain the
judgment within a short time, or at least within a reasonable delay,
the Court can hardly stop them abstaining from a second round of
written pleadings or from asking for long delays. It has the power to
reject such demands and certainly must do so if it gets the
impression that the proceedings before the Court are abused for
political purposes. It must not serve as a storehouse for disputes, the
judicial solution of which is not earnestly wanted.
6. One of the major points of interest is the replacement of the old
Rule called "Appeals to the Court", by the new Rule 87 called
"Special Reference to the Court". The former Rule 72 read as
follows: "When an appeal is made to the Court against a decision
given by some other tribunal, the proceedings before the Court shall
be governed by the provisions of the Statute and of these Rules."
Put in less enigmatic terms, the Rule prescribed that the provisions
on contentious proceedings should be followed. Since the Court had
no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal stricto sensu from any other
tribunal, the Article was never applied. When an appeal was made
against a decision of the Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, it was lodged under the Chicago Convention of 1944
on international civil aviation. 46 This was a convention within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Statute, which provides that the Court
may have jurisdiction on the basis of any treaty in force. A special
article on appeals was therefore held misleading by the Committee
for the Revision of the Rules and subsequently by the Plenary
Court.
The new article is meant to draw the attention of governments and
international organizations to the possibility of providing in any
treaty or convention for the referring of appeals against decisions of
any international body, tribunal or other, to the International Court
of Justice. In order to make it completely clear that this possibility is
nothing more than making use of Article 36 of the Statute in
particular situations, the new article refers expressly to treaties or
conventions establishing jurisdiction of the Court; it adds that the
Rules on contentious cases shall apply. Interpreted in such a way,
the new article is an invitation to States who are parties to
international treaties or conventions to act accordingly. It draws
their attention on a point which has so far often been overlooked.
46. (1972), I.C.J. Reports at 46-50
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7. While in present circumstances there is little chance of
extending the Court's jurisdiction over contentious cases, it may be
less unrealistic to consider granting to it an extended advisory
jurisdiction. Some efforts to improve the proceedings are also made
in the revised Rules on advisory opinions. (Arts. 102-109,
particularly Arts. 105 and 106).
The Court may only answer legal questions .(Art. 65 of the
Statute). The questions formulated by the General Assembly in the
Western Sahara dispute were partly on the borderline between law
and historical research. It may occur that questions will be put
before the Court which have either a political character or a mixed
character of legal and political implications. To embark on the
analysis of such problems may lead the Court to an embarrassing
situation. Although I think the Court should play a greater role in
delivering advisory opinions, I am strongly against requests which
can endanger the Court rather than enhance its role. Suggestions
made to let requests pass through a new committee of the General
Assembly of the United Nations are in my view to be welcomed.
47
Another possibility would be to authorize the Secretary General,
according to Article 96 of the Charter, to submit requests for
advisory opinions either on his own responsibility or upon
instructions of the General Assembly. 48 The Secretary-General
whose legal service is well-informed of the problems appropriate for
an answer by the Court, is best equipped to put the right questions in
the right form. He could avoid a danger implied in the institution of
advisory opinion itself. Legal questions submitted to the Court may
be connected with legal interests of States which in advisory
opinions do not have the position of a party which they would have
in a contentious case. Advisory opinions can therefore be used to
deviate the right of States not to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Court.
8. The tendency of many proposals and of some provisions of the
revised Rules is to combine submission to the Judgment of the Court
with the liberty left to the parties to settle their disputes finally by
negotiation or other means of their choice. This effect can be
reached, to a certain extent, through instituting contentious
47. See supra, note 27 at 682
48. The Secretary-General, in his address at The Hague on April 4, 1978, referred
to this suggestion made recently by several states. See (1977-78), I.C.J. Yearbook
at 124
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proceedings before the Court on the basis of a compromise between
the parties asking the Court to settle the dispute not in its entirety but
only part of it which the parties want to have decided. The model
cases of this kind are the special agreements in accordance with
which the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and the
Netherlands submitted their dispute over the demarcation of their
shares of the continental shelf in the North Sea to the Court. This
attitude has been received with widespread approval. 49 The three
parties requested the Court to hand down a binding judgment on the
issue of which principles and rules were applicable to delimit the
rights of the parties to the continental shelf in the North Sea. They
reserved, however, the delimitation of the boundaries for a future
treaty and did not oblige themselves to draw them up in accordance
with the decision of the Court. 50 They thus had an opportunity to
negotiate on the definite boundaries and to delimit them according
to their respective needs. The Court defined the principles and rules
according to which the delimitation should be made but was not
asked to distribute the shares to the parties. This flexible system
made it easier for the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark to
take account, in their agreement on the boundaries, of Danish
wishes in the respective area. 51
This precedent has been followed for the first time by Libya and
Tunisia in their special agreement for the submission of the question
of the continental shelf between the two countries to the
International Court of Justice, notified to the Court on November
25, 1978. The distribution of matters submitted to the Court and
decisions reserved to the parties differs in certain respects from the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases. The principal idea is however
the same. While the Court is asked to render its judgment on the
principles and rules of international law which may be applied for
the delimitation of the area of the continental shelf appertaining to
each of the litigants, the delimitation shall be fixed by the two
countries themselves.
52
These two cases may initiate a new and, in my view, promising
49. H. Mosler, "Problems and Tasks of International Judicial and Arbitral
Settlement of Disputes Fifty Years After the Founding of the World Court" in
Judicial Settlement, supra, note 10 at 6
50. (1969), I.C.J. Rep. at 6
51. Text of Agreement in (1971), 10 Int'l Legal Materials at 603
52. Arts. I & 2 of the Special Agreement of June 10, 1977, notified to the Court
on December 1, 1978 (I.C.J. Doc. 1978, General List No. 63)
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tendency to submit cases to the Court. Experience has shown that
proceedings instituted by unilateral application have often prevented
the Court from deciding on the merits. In several instances
defendant parties refusing to take any step in the proceedings
referred to the vital national interests involved in the case. 53 Similar
cases, which are certainly detrimental to the Court's authority, are
likely to occur in the future. For the time being special agreements
seem to be the better way to seise the Court than applications
directed against an unwilling respondent. There may be disputes of
a legal character in regard to which the States concerned do not want
to run the risk of an unfavourable binding judgment, but which they
cannot submit to the Court as a request for an advisory opinion, this
procedure being reserved to organs of international organizations.
The parties may be interested in obtaining, in the operative part of a
binding judgment, definitions of the principles and rules of
international law applicable to their case. They may also be
interested, as occurred in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, of
the factors to be taken into account in applying such principles and
rules. Final settlement itself would later be made by an agreement
between the parties achieved on the basis of those principles, rules
and factors.
III.
Among the proposals made in the Sixth Committee for a better
composition of the Court, new countries wished to ensure the
representation of African, Latin American and Asiatic legal
cultures. The number of judges has remained the same since the
time of the Permanent Court, but the distribution from the different
parts of the world has changed to a considerable extent. The
International Court of Justice had up to 1963 only one African and
two Asians among its members. From the later triennial elections of
5 judges, it can be seen that, without any amendment to the Statute,
the Court has been gradually developing as a more representative
organ. It must not be forgotten that, not by any binding rules but in
continuous practice, a national of each of the permanent members of
the Security Council is elected. The number was 5 so long as China,
then represented by the Republic of China in Taiwan, had its own
53. The last example is the Turkish observations in the jurisdictional phase of the
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case referred to in the Court's Judgment of
December 18, 1978. See (1978), I.C.J. Rep. at 13
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national on the bench. For a long time there have been only four
judges coming from the United States, the Soviet Union, France and
Great Britain, The People's Republic of China, since their
government is representing the member-State China, has not yet
availed herself of the opportunity of nominating a candidate. The
present composition, as it resulted from the last elections, is five
judges coming from the western States group, namely from the
three permanent members of the Security Council belonging to that
Group and from Italy and Germany. Three members come from
Africa, two from Latin America, three from Asia - from the
Middle East, India and Japan - and two from socialist countries.
These changes are due to a redistribution within the Court. So far an
increase in its members has been avoided, although proposals in that
direction have been made. 54 In my view, it would not be wise to
follow the examples of the Security Council and the Economic and
Social Council in order to achieve a more balanced representation
by increasing the number of judges. It could only be recommended
on the condition that the Court would overloaded with business
attributed to a number of chambers. On that supposition the
situation of the Court would be similar to the actual work of
European Court of Human Rights, presently consisting of 21 judges
from 21 countries. The Plenary Court acts as a judicial body only
upon reference to it of a case by a chamber. One cannot expect that
an analagous problem will come up in The Hague in the foreseeable
future.
A very numerous bench makes the deliberations necessarily
longer and more complicated. According to my experience from
another court, it is a heavy task for a President to direct the
deliberations of a large body of judges and for the Drafting
Committee to prepare the judgment supported by a substantial
majority and not weakened by too many dissenting or separate
opinions. An increased number of judges of the International Court
of Justice would also increase the problems arising from the
divergences of the judges' legal and regional or national
background. An enlarged composition of the Court could never
reflect all regions, legal cultures and social tendencies which are
found in the more than 150 parties to the Statute.
What the Court really needs is the opportunity of developing
continuously its jurisprudence in many cases of various kinds. This
54. For a discussion of the whole question see T. 0. Elias, supra, note 44 at 22-24
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is on the condition that there is co-operation, guided by an esprit de
corps, which is internationally-minded and anxious to promote a
progressive evolution of law on the basis of recognized methods of
interpretation. The real crisis of the institution is not actually having
this chance. This crisis is due to the unsatisfactory state of the
international community.
